Naumkin_V_-_Islam_i_musulmane_kultura_i_politika_2008

‘Abd alāfi b. Mu sin Ghālib, entrust all that belongs me to the undermentioned brothers ‘Umar, āli and A mad, children of their d e- ceased parent, Mu ammad b. Mu sin Ghālib. This is my firm oblig a- tion and inalienable right. Its total cost and value is eighty hard qurūsh. This stands for all my (property), and I do it without duress, by my own volition and in the proper way, in presence of witnesses.

Wittnessed by	Wittnessed by	Wittnessed by
Abdallāh b. A mad	parent Mu ammad	‘A ān b. āli
Mu ammad ‘Uthmān	A mad Muh ammad	Bū Bak
Las bah ī
al-‘Abbadī	b. Khalaf al-‘Abbadī
	and son usayn A mad
	b. Khalaf
This was written by Mu ammad b. Ah mad		Khalaf al-‘Abbādī.
And let Allah be the best witness.

Comment

Here it is expressly stated that the draftsman of the document is transferring property to his male cousins as a ‘firm obligation.’ Along with this document, its draftsman, Bā Ah mad, also drew up a wi ālah, empowering the same male cousins to dispose of his property (see Document No 8). Perhaps, this document was drafted for the purpose of confirming Ba Ahmad’s redemption of his debt with a mention of its sum – eighty qurūsh.

There is one more, fifth kind of document, not represented in our collection – the agreement on the delimitation of agricultural property. These documents are still carefully kept in the families and often invoked for the settlement of disputes which arise over plantations, roads, stones, trees growing at the boundaries, and so forth.

* * *

Analysis of the documents cited allows to draw certain conclusions. For more definite conclusions it is necessary to expand the scope of material used. The documents show that despite the preservation of a great number of rudiments of the clan and tribal system, in modern times in

Upper Yāfi‘ there was a developed system of private property on land, irrigation facilities and instruments of labour. One may trace a tendency towards redistribution of the tribe’s supply of land in favour of some families at the expense of ruining others and divorcing them from the soil. At that time that process was slow and did not lead to the estab-

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lishment of very large estates. The transfer of land was proceeding by means of mortgage, sale, lease and handover of rights to land disposal. The traditional clan and tribal institutions, including various forms of clan and tribal mutual assistance, obstructed the development of property stratification in the region, hampering economic development. Its stagnant character found its expression in the weak development of commodity-money relations, in the prevalence of the subsistence economy, in the relatively low cost of land, in the use of silver as a measure of value, and in the wasteful spending of funds.

Of great interest are the traditional state and legal institutions of

Upper Yāfi‘. Documents show that customary law whose bearers were the shaikhs was playing a primary part in the life of the tribes of the r e- gion, but in concluding legal acts the sayyids and the qād s also ensured the observance of shar ‘ah norms.

The author expresses his deep gratitude to Dr. ‘Alī	āli	alhulāqī
and Thābit āli Thābit for their enormous help	in	interpreting
the documents.

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SIX TURBULENT MONTHS: MIDDLE EAST IN THE COLD WAR

(DECEMBER 1956 – MAY 1957)

(paper presented at the International Conference on

The History of the Cold War, Cortona, Italy, October 5–6, 2001)

Towards the middle of the 1950s, the Soviet Union livened up its policy in the Arab East, which was in large measure facilitated by the serious political changes in that region and by the increasing gravitation of a number of young Arab states towards Moscow. In September 1955, Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser signed his first agreement on arms deliveries from the countries of the socialist bloc (initially, Soviet weapons were shipped via Czechoslovakia). As a result of this, on 21 July 1956, Egypt was deprived of a loan for the construction of the Aswan Water-Power Complex earlier promised to her by the US, Britain and the IBRD. On 26 July, Nasser issued a decree nationalising the Suez Canal, from whose zone the withdrawal of British troops had been completed in June 1956, and soon, after a sharp aggravation of the sit u- ation, Israel, Britain and France, displeased with Egyptian actions, unleashed an aggression against that country. The Soviet Union resolutely supported Egypt and strongly demanded to stop this military invasion. In December 1956, the Anglo-French troops were withdrawn from Egypt.

The process of rapprochement between Cairo and Moscow set in, in which each of the parties pursued its own objectives that often did not coincide. The extension of the Cold War to the region expressed itself in US attempts to hinder the veering to the left of the political spectrum in the states in the region and prevent the Soviet Union from gaming certain positions in them. The so-called Eisenhower Doctrine proclaimed in early 1957 was partly calculated to produce this effect. After the events of the fall of 1956, relations with Egypt took on an increasing importance for the Soviet leadership. At the end of 1956, Nasser decided to visit the USSR next summer. Working out Egypt's foreign and internal policy plans, he requested Soviet government opinion on a number of questions and informed them on steps he was going to take.

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On December 31, he, for example, told the Soviet ambassador E.D.Kiselyov on his intention to hand Hammarskjold a note declaring the 1954 Anglo-Egyptian agreement null and void1, and also on an attempt on his life by the British. Nasser was also concerned about Eisenhower’s intention to ask Congress the right to use US armed forces in the Middle East' In this connection, he asked the Soviet government to provide the necessary information and advice. In the same conversation,

Nasser informed Moscow of the “impetuous US activity for the creation of a Union of North Africa, to include Tunisia, Morocco, Libya and then Algeria”2. Nasser complained about the folly of the Egyptian military attaché in Libya, who, after having organized a number of major acts of sabotage against the British bases in Libya in 1956, “caused the strongest discontent of Ben Halim”, for which he was subsequently tried.

In connection with the report on the stepped-up US activity in Northern Africa, Kiselyov proposed to Moscow to speed up the formation of Soviet embassies in Tunisia and Morocco as much as poss i- ble. For his part, the ambassador informed Nasser about the US pressuring of the Arab countries by way of Iran for the purpose of creating an

Islamic pact, calling all this “parts of a single imperialist chain”, to which one could also add the idea of an “African security belt”. The ambassador reported that these plans were directed “at the destruction of Arab unity and the political isolation of Egypt”3.

Nasser also informed the ambassador that the US had refused to provide food aid to Egypt by grain deliveries. He requested the opinion of the Soviet government on the two questions he was discussing with the American ambassador, – on the Suez Canal and the Palestinian problem.

Egypt’s position on the canal was reaffirmed – “no international control in any.form, only international cooperation with all countries”4.

Moscow’s rapprochement with Cairo was also facilitated by the fact that on 31 December 1956, USSR Foreign Minister D.T. Shepilov gave the ambassador an instruction to visit Nasser or Sabri and inform them of the decision on the shipment of Soviet military equipment in accordance with the agreements concluded earlier.

1iselyov’s cable of 1 January 1957, Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation (AVP RF), fund 059, inventory 38, file 39, document 164, sheet 1.

2Op.cit., sheet 4.

3Op.cit., sheet 5.

4Op.cit., sheet 7.

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After Eisenhower’s statement on the Middle East on 5 January, that was soon called a doctrine, Ali Sabri, head of the chancellery of the president of Egypt, on 8 January met the Soviet ambassador on Nasser’s instructions. He informed the ambassador that the president gave an order to allow the Egyptian press “a complete freedom of all-round criticism of US plans in the Middle East”. As one of the measures to oppose

US plans he named the beginning of the Egyptian government's course towards strengthening allied relations with Syria and Jordan. The Egyptian leader believed that Lebanon “could be tempted by Eisenhower's promises”. Sabri voiced an opinion, regarded by his interlocutor as that of Nasser, on the “extreme desirability of a statement by the Soviet government, in which it would be necessary to proclaim the readiness of the Soviet Union to offer economic assistance to the Arab countries without any political conditions, declaring at the same time that the S o- viet Union cannot remain indifferent to a US military intervention in the affairs of the Middle East”5. Kiselyov, carrying out orders from

Moscow, subjected Eisenhower’s plan to a sharp criticism, adding that it would be better if the Arab countries themselves made an official statement apropos of this. Personally, Kiselyov added that it would be a rightful thing to do to raise urgently the question of the threat of US i n- tervention in the affairs of the Middle East at a session of the General Assembly. The calculation behind this was that a negative opinion could be formed in the UN concerning US plans, and this, in turn, could, in the opinion of the ambassador, induce the Democratic majority in Congress to come out in opposition to these plans for the motives of interparty struggle6.

Sabri did not share the ambassador’s optimism concerning the General Assembly. He said that the large Latin American bloc of UN member states would ensure support for the US. Besides, he expressed anx i- ety in connection with the position of India, indicating that Nehru's statement on the Eisenhower doctrine was weak. In his words, Eisenhower’s statement in essence meant “joining the Baghdad pact without formal announcement and the encouragement of the pro-Western forces in the Arab world”7.

The Egyptian leaders also continued to communicate to the Soviet ambassador the information on the planned North African Union, voic-

5Record of a conversation of 8 January, AVP RF, 087/20/41/9, sheet 2.

6Op.cit., sheet 3.

7Ibid.

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ing strong anxiety in this connection and hoping that Moscow would oppose these plans.

The question of Israeli troops in Egyptian territory was an object of permanent consultations. On 24 January Ali Sabri informed the Soviet ambassador on the Egypt’s position of on this question, asking for a d- vice. The question was so important that at the USSR First Deputy Mi n- ister of Foreign Affairs A.A.Gromyko’s submission of 30 January, a guideline Ruling of the CPSU Central Committee was adopted on it, according to customary procedure. It read:

1.The Soviet government understands and shares the Egyptian government’s concern in connection with the delay in the withdrawal of the Israeli troops from Egyptian territory. It considers that such Israeli actions have become possible due to their encouragement on the part of the US government which is building its policy towards the Middle East on the basis of the principles of the “Eisenhower doctrine”. Tell the

Egyptian government that if it seeks the imposition, in accordance of the UN Charter, of economic sanctions on Israel in order to force her to withdraw the troops from Egyptian territory, the Soviet delegation in the UN will support the Egyptian delegation on this question.

2.The use of the question of clearing the Suez Canal as a means of pressure on Israel for the purpose of accelerating the withdrawal of her troops from Egyptian territory is, in our opinion, a strong expedient. However, this expedient must be employed only as a last resort, with extra care, after having previously secured the support of Arab and ot h- er countries of Asia and Africa. The problem of the Suez Canal is of great international significance and affects the interests of many coun-

tries, and in this connection a deliberate delay in the clearing of the S u- ez Canal by the Egyptian government without a corresponding preparation may aggravate Egypt’s international situation and be used by

Western powers as a fresh pretext for anti-Egyptian provocations.

3. 3. In the Soviet government’s opinion, it would be advisable that on the question of the Gulf of Akaba the governments of Jordan and Saudi Arabia, which are directly interested, along with Egypt, in the speediest withdrawal of Israeli troops from the coast of this gulf and from the islands of Tiran and Sanafir, come out more resolutely in support of Egypt at the present moment. In particular, the Egyptian government might recommend to the governments of Jordan and Saudi Arabia to send the UN Secretary General a written appeal with the r e- quest to take more effective and resolute measures for the liberation of the coast Gulf of Akaba and the above islands.

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In connection with the dragging out of the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Egyptian territory, the return of the Soviet ambassador A. Abramov to Israel, originally planned for 26 December 1956, was postponed during that period. In a note to the USSR Deputy Foreign Minister V. A. Zorin of 26 January 1957 Abramov wrote:

“From the statements of the Israeli government one can see visible that it considers the Gaza Strip to be a disputed area, intending to annex it, and wants to keep the coast of the Gulf of Akaba until it receives guarantees of the freedom of Israeli navigation in the Gulf. One may presume that these Israeli claims were inspired by England, France and the US, which do not hide their intention to use the Israeli occupation of the above areas for pressuring Egypt. This is confirmed, in particular, by the fact that Israel, in response to the resolution of the session of the UN SC of 19 January which obliged her to withdraw troops from the territory of Egypt in five days, declared on 23 January in a in,a pointed manner on its refusal to abide by this resolution.

At the same time Egypt now does not have any effective means of forcing Israel to withdraw from the occupied areas. Our means of pressure against Israel – the recall of our ambassador and the termination of the Soviet-Israeli trade – are not effective enough and are gradually losing their value”8 Abramov believed that the resolution of the question of the Gaza Strip and the Israeli navigation in the Gulf of Akaba cold not be expected in the coming months and that his return to Israel was inappropriate, as it would be regarded in the Arab countries as an “ind i- rect approval of aggression”. He suggested relieving him from the duty of an ambassador without appointing a new one9.

Anyhow, the Soviet embassy to Israel continued working. In connection with reception of a working plan of the Department Of the Countries of the Near and Middle East of the USSR Foreign Ministry for the first quarter of 1957, the Soviet charge d’affaires in Israel

N. Klimov informed the Head of the Department, G. T. Zaitsev, of the embassy’s opinion. The plan, wrote limov, USSR raised no question of working out the position concerning Israel in the light of changes caused by the aggression against Egypt, nor did it take into account the

“changes in the Jewish question in connection with the events that took place in Poland and Hungary”. The letter went on to say: “The aggre s- sion of Israel against Egypt has shown a substantial change in Israel’s

8AVP RF, 089/10/23/2, sheet 3.

9Op.cit., sheet 4.

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role in the affairs of the Middle East. Israel has proved that she can a t- tack the neighbouring Arab countries at any moment when it is of advantage to her. It is also necessary to bear in mind that Israel possesses a significant scientific staff and a corresponding equipment for the preparation and realization of bacteriological means of attack.

For the last four months up to 8,000 Jewish immigrants from P o- land arrived in Israel. Among them are former employees of the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs, military intelligence, security service, outstanding scientists, including atomic physicists and well-known bacteriologists. In the nearest future one may expect the arrival of a signif i- cant number of Jews from Hungary, among them well-known scientists and outstanding physicians. Israel receives a significant reinforcement for the realization of subversive work against the Soviet Union and the socialist countries, and also against her neighbours”10.

Though Nasser continued to assure the Soviet leadership of his sharply negative attitude towards the Eisenhower doctrine and to demand from Moscow an active counteraction to its realization, he did not want to quarrel with the US and preferred to avoid declar a- tions. The USSR Foreign Ministry wrote to the CPSU Central Co m- mittee on 8 February 1957 in this connection: “As reported by co m- rade Kuznetsov from New York, during the discussion at the UN

General Assembly of Hammarskjold’s report and the question of d e- ployment of UN armed forces in Egyptian territory, the Egyptian delegation took a rather unstable position and in fact made serious concessions to the US.

Also noteworthy is the fact that this unstable position of the Egyptian delegation was actively supported by the representatives of India. The position of the Egyptian and Indian delegations, as well as the decisions taken by the General Assembly on 2 February caused anxiety, especially in Syria and Jordan.

The behaviour of the Egyptian delegation suggests that under US pressure the Egyptian government is to some extent falling back on its former positions.

Taking into account the above-mentioned circumstances, the USSR Foreiga Ministry deems it expedient to authorise our ambassadors to Egypt, Syria and India. in a confidential and informal manner to exchange opinions with Nasser, Quatli and Nehru concerning the situation that been formed in the Near and Middle East.

10 AVP RF, 084/10/23/1, sheet 2.

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The USSR Foreign Ministry also deems it expedient to inform the Chinese friends about this”.

In the draft instructions to the Soviet ambassador to Egypt worked out the Foreign Ministry on behalf of the Foreign Minister D. T. Shepilov, one of the dangerous tendencies in development of the situation in the Near and Middle East was referred to as follows: “The United States of America, using a serious military, moral and political defeat of England and France in their aggressive war against Egypt, is taking urgent measures to adopt and implement the so-called Eisenhower doctrine, whose objective, as was rightly indicated by you, mister president, is to strengthen US political, economic and military positions in the Near and Middle East and to take the place of England and France in this area”11.

The draft spoke of Israel’s encouragement by the US, Britain and

France and their fostering the delay in the withdrawal of troops from the territory of Egypt. Thus, as the Foreign Ministry believed, these countries sought “to create the preconditions for a substantial and in no way justified enhancement of the functions of UN armed forces in the territory of Egypt, obviously expecting to use these armed forces for their imperialist purposes, put pressure on Egypt and other Arab countries in the process of the settlement of the Suez question and other

Middle Eastern problems”12.

The Soviet Foreign Ministry believed that the UN SC resolution of 2 February 1957 on the deployment of UN armed forces concealed

“danger to Egypt and other Arab countries” and could be used by the US and Western powers “to implement their colonialist plans”13. The reference to the report of the UN General Secretary of 24 January co n- tained in the resolution was considered in the USSR Foreign Ministry as a serious concession to Israel. “The decision on the deployment of the UN armed forces in the territory of Egypt along the demarcation line with Israel and the granting of extended functions to her provides an opportunity for Israel to ensure for herself a stable rear from the side of Egypt, which frees Israel's hands to carry on a provocative, aggre s- sive policy with regard to Syria and Jordan”14.

In Moscow saw the connection between the Eisenhower doctrine and “the desire of the US and other Western powers to occupy the stra-

11Op.cit., sheet 4.

12Ibid.

13Op.cit., sheet 3.

14Op.cit., sheet 4.

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tegically important areas of Egypt by UN armed forces” in order to is o- late her from other Arab countries, which the US intended, as the USSR believed, to draw into aggressive blocs. Moscow was dissatisfied with Egypt's insufficiently active and clear position on this question.

In this connection, the draft instruction to the Soviet ambassador to Syria said that the US, together with England, France and Israel, by e x- erting evergrowing pressure on Syria and Jordan, “harboured plans for the overthrow of the republican regime in Syria and the dismemberment of Jordan”15. In the process, as the draft instruction noted, Shukri Quatli was to be told that not all the Arab countries perceived the “link b e- tween the Eisenhower Doctrine and the desire of the USA and other Western powers to occupy by the UN armed forces the strategically important regions of Egypt”. The ambassador was to find out how Quatli appraised the possible consequences of the UN SC decision of 2 February on the deployment of UN armed forces in the territory of Egypt along the demarcation line with Israel, along the coast of the Gulf of Akaba and in the Ga a Strip, and also to find out which steps Syria’s president deemed necessary to take “in order to hinder the implementation of measures planned by the colonialists in the Near and Middle East”.

The Soviet leadership, as may be judged from the diplomatic archives of the period, sought to rely on a possibly greater number of A r- ab countries – parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict, using their fear of a possibly intensified US pressure on them (Egypt, Syria and, to a lesser degree, Jordan, where calculations were made on the government headed by the leader of the National Socialist Party – Suleiman an-Nabulsi, which came to power after the election in October 1956). The main task was, naturally, to prevent the growth of US influence and the increase in the number of countries participating in blocs with American membership. After the 1956 events, the USSR still more definitely began to be inclined to supporting the Arabs in the Arab-Israeli conflict. At the same time Moscow exhibits restraint, calling on the Arabs to do likewise, unwilling to enter into confrontation with the USA in the region and taking account of the fact that the Eisenhower government also exercised restraint in supporting Israel. Egypt, relations with which substantially improved after the Suez crisis, attracted Moscow's ever - growing attention.

In February 1957, Soviet diplomats were paying attention to the development of the situation regarding the canal. As followed from

15 Op.cit., sheet 6.

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