Naumkin_V_-_Islam_i_musulmane_kultura_i_politika_2008

On the question of UN troops, Nasser told the Soviet ambassador that as long as Egypt lagged behind in the preparedness of its armed forces, the presence of UN forces on the border with Israel was useful, and such a situation would allow Egypt to gain time for rearming and training her army, allowing greater room for manoeuvre. If the UN forces now left, this would put Egypt in a difficult position: any Israeli attack on Ga a, given Egypt’s virtual lack of air force, would lead to a situation where Egypt would have nothing to respond with.

Nasser acquainted the Soviet leadership with Egyptian intelligence data on the preparation by Israel of a new aggression against Egypt, based on confidential information received from a of a high-ranking French figure. According to this information, the French Defence Minister insisted on vengeance on Egypt, considering the military actions against Egypt in October-November 1956 to have been a major mistake and believing that “the liquidation of Nasser’s regime in Egypt was and remains a unique opportunity to shore up the positions of France in the Middle East”44. For this it was allegedly proposed to send a six- thousand-strong paratroop unit commanded by General Massu to Cairo with the purpose of killing Nasser and other leading Egyptian figures and to form a new government led by the former Egyptian Interior Minister (before the 1952 revolution) Murtada al-Maragi who resided in Beyrut.

In connection with Nasser’s appeal, Gromyko on 6 April sent to the CPSU Central Committee a draft resolution on the advisability to hand him through the Soviet ambassador some data in possession of the Main Intelligence Department of the General Staff of the Soviet Army. The instructions to the ambassador on this occasion, approved by the CPSU Central Committee, read:

“Please visit Ali Sabri and inform Nasser through him that accor d- ing to the data available to us, the French Navy indeed put off on 26 March from the port of Toulon in direction of Algeria in roughly the same strength of which the president had spoken. However, this navy did not proceed in the eastern direction and remained in the area of Algeria, engaged in the tasks of military training.

As of 1 April this year, units of the 10-th French paratroop division continued to remain in the area of Orleansville. There are no data on the movement of this division, and also of any other units to the island of Cyprus.

44 Op.cit., sheet 60.

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The Israeli army is presently in a state of increased combat readiness, and her armoured troops have received an order to replenish their supplies and food stocks; however, a concentration of a great number of troops at the borders with Egypt has not been noted.

Please tell Ali Sabri that if our intelligence bodies receive in formation indicating that a military aggression is being prepared against Egypt, the President will immediately be informed of it”45.

Thus Nasser’s alarmist claims found no support from Moscow which did not see a direct threat of a new armed action by Israel against Egypt and wished to discourage precipitate actions by the parties so as not to be entangled into a really dangerous confrontation with the West. Soviet diplomats persistently tried to dissuade Israel from any attempts to resolve the conflict with the Arabs by military means. In particular, the Soviet ambassador to Israel A. N. Abramov in a conversation with

nesset deputy Riftin told him that “Israel will not achieve the settl ement of the conflict by military force, but may lose much along this way, and that the only road for Israel is that of friendship with the Arab countries, the road of peaceful coexistence. Besides this, I added that the realization of this road depends only and exclusively on Israel itself, which must give, up the policy of protecting the interests of petroleum monopolies and be the first to undertake peaceful steps towards the Arab countries. These steps might pave the way for a peaceful settlement”46.

It can be clearly seen, that on the foreign-policy questions discussed during the conversations, not only did Nasser not always act on recommendations from Moscow, but at times caused the remlin’s irr i- tation with his policies. The USSR ambassador to Syria Nemchina even expressed discontent with the behaviour of the Egyptian delegation in the UN, which shranked from contact with the Soviet delegation. Nasser informed the Soviet ambassador that after the conclusion of the agreement on the delivery of Soviet weapons to Egypt the American representative tried to tempt him with the possibility to obtain major financial aid from the US in exchange for “complete cooperation” with it, to which he did not agree. The President of Egypt informed Moscow that ing Saud, who was “carrying a double game and a double policy” probably gave in to US promises47. Nasser specified, in particular, that all the actions of Jordan against Egypt and the Jordanian national patri-

45AVP RF, AVP RF, 087/20/41/15, sheet 8.

46Record of conversation of 19 April 1957, in: AVP RF, 089/10/23/3, sheet 57.

47Cable of 25 April 1957, AVP RF, 059/38/48/166, sheet 151.

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otic forces were being undertaken at Saud’s instigation. The Egyptian

President declared to the ambassador that whereas earlier the E gyptian government preferred not to criticize King Husein and King Saud openly, now, since April 20, “it is necessary to go into an offensive against the attempts of Hussein and Saud to subordinate the Arabs to the Eise n- hower Doctrine”48. If Jordan stood her ground, she would be a “tombstone of the Eisenhower Doctrine”.

Nasser obviously expected to ingratiate himself with Moscow by his critique of the Eisenhower Doctrine. However, in reality, as his further steps show, he took a more cautious position.

Nasser made it known that he considered as his main danger “the possibility of an Israeli aggression against Jordan”, in which case Egypt “will act with weapons in hands against Israel by all means available to her – aviation and army”49. This statement caused no enthusiasm in the Soviet ambassador who was trying to convince the President of the e f- fectiveness of the means of political and diplomatic pressure.

As well as in the previous conversations, Nasser informed the ambassador of attempts that were being made on his life, this time by the

“US intelligence bodies”. The Egyptian counter-intelligence, he said, had already uncovered eight such attempts.

The criticism of King Saud by Nasser in that conversation was rather harsh. Nasser promised to the ambassador to give him a copy of the text of the treaty on the lease of the US military base at Dahran.

In reply to ambassador’s cable, the USSR Minister of Foreign A f- faires A.A. Gromyko on 29 April 1957 cabled his instructions to Kiselyov. He asked him to tell Nasser that Moscow positively viewed the declaration of the Egyptian government on the Suez question and that the USSR would support Egypt in the UN Security Council. Gromyko requested Nasser’s opinion on whether it was necessary to raise in the UN SC the question on the inadmissibility of foreign intervention in Jordan, which, by the way, would distract attention from the Suez problem, and this suited the interests of Egypt50.

A great attention in the correspondence was attached to the problem of the straits. Gromyko instructed the Soviet ambassador:

“As far as the question of the legal regime of the Gulf of Akaba is concerned, tell Nasser that, in the opinion of Soviet experts in interna-

48Op.cit., sheet 153.

49Op.cit., sheet 154.

50Cable from Gromyko, AVP RF, 059/38/41/173, sheet 49.

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tional law, there are no definite norms to regulate the navigation regime in such gulfs. Outstanding experts in international law adhere to the opinion that the navigation regime in such gulfs must be established by agreement between littoral states. It is obvious that given the existing relations between,-the Arab littoral countries and Israel, such agreement is at present difficult to achieve. At the same time, it apparently has to be taken into account that the coast of the Strait of Tiran is presently monitored by UN troops, that the situation in Jordan is not quite clear yet, and that also unclear is the real position of the king of Saudi Arabia, who, in the opinion of President Nasser, engages in double dealing and may be in a certain collusion with the Americans.

Therefore it seems advisable for tactical reasons at this moment not to focus on the problem of navigation in the Gulf of Akaba and to co n- centrate on the final settlement of the Suez question. Such a settlement would depreciate the projects for the construction of an oil pipeline through the territory of Israel, which have arisen in connection with the Suez crisis, of a bypass canal, etc. The settlement of the Suez issue on the basis of recognition of the sovereign rights of Egypt would strengthen the positions of Egypt still more both in other Arab countries and on the international scene as a whole”51. The Soviet minister recommended Nasser to determine Egypt's position on the Akaba question

“by limiting, herself to a statement of the Egyptian government that the

Strait, of Tiran is located in Egyptian territorial waters and that the passage of foreign courts through that strait is subject to regulation” 52. Simultaneously, Gromyko recommended to refrain from military measures aimed at preventing foreign ships from passing through that strait.

In April 1957, the main attention of the Soviet government in connection with the new developments in the Middle East was switched to Jordan. There, the Nabulsi government resigned, martial law was imposed and the activity of the political parties banned. On 19 April, the Soviet government in its notes to the USA, Britain and France submitted a proposal to make a joint statement condemning the use of force as a means of resolution of unsettled problems in the region of the Near and Middle East.

The Soviet government’s statement on the events in Jordan of 30 April read:

51Cable from Gromyko, AVP RF, 059/38/41/173, sheet 50–51.

52Op.cit., sheet 51.

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“The situation in the Near and Middle East presently became a g- gravated again. This time it was Jordan that became the object of imp e- rialist intrigues. During the recent two or three weeks, crude pressure from the outside was put on Jordan and the Jordanian government, accompanied now by threats to dismember her territory and deprive the Jordanian people of national independence, now by promises to render financial and other aid in case if reprisals are made against the patriotic forces in Jordan that oppose Jordan’s submission of foreign diktat. In the process, they do not conceal that following Jordan, Syria as well as

Egypt, which resolutely reject the notorious ‘Dulles-Eisenhower Doctrine’ and any attempts to draw them into aggressive blocs, undermine their national independence and subordinate their foreign policy to the plans of colonial circles, may become the objects of similar colonialist actions”53.

Moscow expected that Egypt would take a determined position concerning the events in Jordan. However, as was reported in a political letter of the Soviet embassy to Egypt, “the Egyptian government has desisted from giving open support for the national forces in Jordan which in their policy leaned on Egypt and Syria.

However, it tried, along with the Syrian government, to influence the course of events in Jordan through King Saud. As stated by Nasser and Sabri, talks with Saud did not yield any desirable results, as King Saud declared that the king will defend his interests in Jordan by all means at his disposal. Nasser and Sabri made it clear that Egypt could not now rely on Saud, who in substance has turned into an American associate in the Middle East.

Refraining from taking an official position relative to the Jordanian events and Saud’s behaviour, the Egyptian government has given i n- structions to the press to wage a campaign against the reactionary for c- es in Jordan, the US and Iraqi intervention in these events, without touching the personalities of Hussein and Saud”54. Nasser spoke against the USSR's raising the question of the events in Jordan in the Security

Council, motivating this by saying that the “reactionary forces will then try to represent the democratic and national elements in the country as Communist agents, thereby complicating their straggle against the forc-

53AVP RF, 092/11/2/2, sheet 3.

54Political letter of the Soviet embassy to Egypt, 15 May 1957, in: AVP RF, 087/20/40/3, sheet 6–7.

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es of reaction and making it easier for the US to conduct their policy of isolation of Egypt”55.

Thus the six months, which elapsed from the termination of military operations by Britain, France and Israel in Egypt until the crisis in Jordan were a period of a more active involvement of the Middle Eastern region in the Cold War. The Soviet Union strove to win allies in the region by directing the bulk of its diplomatic efforts at the discrediting of the Eisenhower Doctrine which, as Moscow believed, threatened to draw the new states of the region into blocs hostile to it. The USSR i n- creasingly supported the Arabs in their conflict with Israel. However, as we can see from the diplomatic correspondence the Soviet leadership exercised a maximum of caution so as not to allow itself to be drawn into a confrontation with the West in the region and tried to dissuade its Arab partners from precipitate actions. In relations with Moscow, these countries pursued their own objectives and frequently tried to shift on it the burden of counteraction to threats directed against them.

55 Op.cit., sheet 7.

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SOVIET DIPLOMACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

DURING THE 1956 CRISIS

(доклад на I Всемирном конгрессе ближневосточных исследований, г. Майнц, 8–13 сентября 2002)

Much has been written about the events of the fall of 1956, when the forces of Israel, Britain and France invaded Egyptian territory. In the works devoted to that dangerous crisis that pitted Cold War adve r- saries against each other the documentary base has been insufficiently tapped due to the classified nature of many archive documents. This article pursues an aim of filling this gap and, with the help of just recently declassified documents from the Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation, to shed a new light on Soviet policy in the Middle East concerning the Suez crisis just before and during the hostilities.

I shall not touch upon the causes that led to the aggravation of the situation in the region, which have been analyzed in detail in the works of historians, or the grave consequences of the armed attack on Egypt for the future of the Middle East and the international situation on a broader scale, but will focus on the practical aspects of Soviet policy.

It is known that by the fall of 1956 that USSR had clearly set the priorities of its policy in the Middle Eastern region, increasingly supporting Arab states and growing ever more critical of Israeli policy. A statement by the Soviet government made by Deputy Foreign Minister Valerian Zorin to the Israeli representative on September 24, in particular, drew attention to the incidents that took place between Israel on the one hand,

Egypt and Jordan on the other, noting that “these incidents took place at a considerable distance from the demarcation lines, deep inside the territories of Egypt and Jordan, which could not have happened without a deliberate penetration of Israeli military units into the territory of these countries.”1

As always, winning over to its side the political leaders of Arab states and lending assistance to those of them who favored the Soviet Union was

1 Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation (AVP RF), fund 089, inventory 9, file 21, dossier 2, sheet 47.

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an important avenue of Moscow’s diplomatic activity. This can be traced with reference to the example of draft instructions prepared by the USSR Foreign Ministry towards a visit to the Soviet Union of Syrian President Shukri Kuatli; which took place on October 31 – November 3, 1956. The document noted that “in Syria’s ruling circles there is no unity on questions dealing with the country’s foreign policy,” and that “there is a strong current against further rapprochement between Syria and the Soviet Union.”2 In the process, Kuatli was regarded as one of the leaders of a group standing for closer ties with Moscow and its allies. Provision was made to inform Kuwatli that “the USA, Britain and France have only changed their tactics on the Suez question, but have not relinquished their intentions to lay their hands on the vital functions of Sue Canal management.” This goal was to be achieved by creating a restricted Association of Suez Canal Users, by means of which it was envisaged “to isolate Egypt from the states that supported it.” At the same time, the official negotiators were to “note the key role of the USA in this question, which strives to lay its hands on the key positions of the Sue Canal and force Britain and France out of it.”3

Clearly evident behind this was Soviet diplomacy’s desire to co n- centrate the fire on the main axis of advance – to oppose the strategic adversary, with the USA viewed as one even then.

The drafters of the document suggested making a special mention of the role of Syria and Kuwatli personally in resisting attempts to expand the Baghdad Pact at the expense of Arab countries. It was pr o- posed to suggest to the Syrian guest an idea of a special threat presented to Syria by the Baghdad Pact in view of the fact that the former directly bordered on two of its participants – Iraq and Turkey. In this connection, during the talks it was proposed to say that “Syria’s concern over Turkey’s encroachments in the Syrian border area was understood by the Soviet Union.”4 One should not too simplistically regard these reasonings of the instructions’ authors solely through the prism of making use of Arab states in the Soviet interests of opposing the West and most notably the USA. Characteristic of Soviet diplomacy in those days, b e- sides the obvious and understandable pragmatic, and sometimes cyn i- cal, calculations connected with the interests of ensuring the country’s security and neutralizing the existing threats, was also the desire to shore up independent Arab states. The Soviet vision of the region at the

2AVP RF, 0128/19/24/7, sheet 37.

3Op.cit., sheet 39.

4Op.cit., sheet 40.

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time was based on the idea of the paramount role of struggle between forces standing for the consolidation of independence and the “neo - colonial” Western policies.

The Foreign Ministry deemed it necessary for the Soviet leadership to make a favorable comment on the decision by the Syrian parliament to set up a Syrian-Egyptian federation. On the Palestinian question, it was decided to recommend Kuwatli to display a maximum of prudence in the search for a solution to this issue, “so as not to give Western powers a pretext for aggravating the Arab-Israeli conflict with the aim of implementing their colonialist plans in the Middle East.”5 Soviet diplomats proposed to “discuss the question of the advisability of concluding a treaty of friendship and non-aggression between Syria and the USSR,” to promise to give a positive response to any wishes by Syria in the field of economic cooperation, and also, if the Syrian side “broaches the question of assistance in training to use the special equipment supplied from the USSR,” to say that

Moscow was ready to send instructors and specialists there.

Soviet diplomats were maintaining contacts with the Israeli leadership as well, to say nothing of Western powers.6 Shortly before the invasion of Egypt by Anglo-Franco-Israeli troops, on September 26, Soviet Ambassador to Israel A. Abramov was invited to the Israeli Foreign Ministry, where Foreign Minister Golda Meir expressed her government’s disagreement with “Moscow’s wrongful and biased accusations against it.” Meir tried to persuade Abramov that Israel was under “a l- most daily attack by Arab countries” (in particular, Jordan), that “only reciprocal retaliations were holding back Arab aggression,” that “the Arabs were threatening to annihilate Israel day after day” and that Na s- ser repeatedly stated that Israel “had to be thrown into the sea.” 7

Abramov categorically objected to the minister, defending an assessment given in the September 24 statement by the Soviet government. He said that the claim that Israel was only retaliating in response to Arab attacks was at odds with reality and mentioned aggressive statements from the Israeli side addressed to the Arabs, saying, in particular, that “now a large part of the Israeli press demands that Egypt and Jordan “be punished.” The ambassador even appealed to “the s o- cialist consciousness” of Golda Meir: “Egypt is now waging a difficult

5Op.cit., sheets 40–41.

6This article deals exclusively with materials of diplomatic correspondence concerning Middle Eastern states.

7AVP RF, 089/9/21/ 3, sheets 162–166.

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but just struggle against the imperialist powers, for its sovereignty, for the right to dispose of its property. Had it now been defenseless, would the imperialist predators have really counted with it? You are a socialist and know full well that these predators recogni e force alone.”8

On the eve of the triple aggression, Soviet diplomacy stepped up its actions in condemnation of Israel’s policies towards Arab states. On October 26, 1956, Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, in a cable to the Soviet UN Mission bearing a stamp of “Top Secret. No Copies to Be Made,” instructed Soviet diplomats during the discussion in the Security Council of Jordan’s complaint about Israel’s aggressive actions against it to seek its support by other SC members, using “the materials exposing Israeli extremists in possession of Hammarskjold and Arab representatives” in the process. “It is advisable to impress on Hammarskjold,” Gromyko wrote, “the need to come out in favor of relaxing tensions in the Jordan area and condemn Israeli aggressive actions.”9 In this case, it was proposed to use the September 24 statement by the Soviet government.

Soviet representatives were instructed, “while condemning the a g- gressive actions of Israel being committed by it against Arab countries under the pretext of “retaliatory strikes” and “acts of retribution,” to show that they contravened UN principles and ran counter to UN decisions on the Palestinian question.

A mobilization in Israel was causing growing concern in Moscow and a spate of diplomatic activity in the Middle Eastern terrain. The question of the situation in the Middle East was discussed at the highest level of party and state leadership. According to reminiscences by vete r- ans of the diplomatic service, “the Instance” demanded from all departments to carefully monitor the evolution of the situation. On October 29, Soviet Ambassador to Egypt Ye. Kiselyov reported on a meeting with Ali Sabri, then head of chancellery of the Egyptian president. Sabri explained to Kiselyov the mobilization in Israel by the following points:

1.The failure of the British plan to bring in Iraqi troops into Jordan.

2.The conclusion of a military alliance between Jordan, Syria and Egypt (on October 25, they signed an agreement on the creation of a unified command).

3.Certain statements “of an incongruously militant tone” in Jordan with regard to Israel.

4.The pro-Egyptian makeup of the new Jordanian government.

8Ibid.

9AVP RF, 059a/7/13/4, sheet 148.

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