VII. Summarise the text, using the words and phrases given below

to maintain competitiveness; to reduce overall costs; to produce sizeable savings; to value goods for customs duty purposes; to eliminate smth from calculation; to determine the customs value; to ignore certain cost inputs; to apply rules carefully; to submit VAT returns monthly; to differ from the requirements outside the community; to be located in overseas markets; to generate high taxes locally; to represent an absolute cost; local tax on business profits; a fixed place of business; a local agent.

VIII. Translate into English

1. Если строго следовать всем перечисленным правилам, то можно значительно снизить стоимость импорта товаров.

2. При определении таможенной стоимости возможно не учитывать некоторые составляющие затрат.

3. В Великобритании ставка налога на прибыль корпораций составляет 30%, однако ставка налога на прибыль, полученную заграничными филиалами корпораций, будет значительно выше.

5. Несмотря на то, что экспортируются товары с нулевым рейтингом, таможня требует документы, подтверждающие факт вывоза товаров из страны.

6. Деятельность независимых агентов означает присутствие компании в стране, однако не облагается налогом на прибыль.

IX. Meet as one group. One of you should lead the meeting. Supply details to prove the following

1. Every element of the business process needs to be examined to see how the effects of the strong currency can best be countered.

2. The international aspects of corporation tax planning are also important.

X. Work as two groups. Discuss the following statements

1. Exporters who sell from a strong currency into a weaker one face an uphill battle to maintain competitiveness.

2. Local tax is not paid on business profits where there is no permanent establishment.

Unit 1.6. The European Central Bank Text 1 The European Bank Supervision

Pre-reading tasks

1. Suggest a purpose for reading the text.

2. What can the text be about?

3. Do you agree that the ECB has been widely criticized?

The infant European Central Bank (ECB) has been bullied by almost everybody in its first 14 months in the monetary playground. It has been widely criticized for its lack of transparency and accountability, and for a flawed system of financial supervision. A new report published by the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) agrees with most of the criticisms, but rejects the popularly prescribed remedies.

The ECB is certainly less transparent than the Bank of England, which has been set a clear inflation target by the chancellor, and publishes minutes of policy meetings and the voting records of individual members of its Monetary Policy Committee. The ECB, in contrast, sets its own target. Indeed, it has set itself two targets: for monetary growth and for inflation. Since these can conflict, it is hard for the markets to understand how the ECB reaches its decisions. The bank's refusal to publish voting records or minutes clouds matters further.

To increase transparency, most outsiders have urged the ECB to publish votes and minutes. But the authors of the CEPR report argue that, under its current set-up, the ECB is wise not to. Attributing votes and opinions to members from different countries would increase the focus on national differences, and so undermine the bank's credibility.

Blueprints developed at other central banks may not work at the ECB, because there is a tension within Europe between the desire for more integration and a reluctance to cede national political control. The CEPR report considers ways to reduce this tension. First, the ECB should be set an explicit inflation target by the European Parliament, so there can be no disagreement about the goal of monetary policy. Second, it recommends that the power of the executive board be increased relative to that of national central-bank governors, who are more likely to be influenced by national interests. At the moment, all 11 governors can vote, outweighing the six-member executive board. Better, perhaps, if only five, say, were allowed to vote at any time, with revolving terms - like the arrangements for district-bank presidents in America's Federal Reserve System.

The same tension between European integration and national control also poses problems for bank supervision. Banks are likely to become more pan-European as the single currency encourages cross-border mergers and greater cross-border exposures. A failure in one country could thus spill more quickly to other parts of Europe. Unfortunately, the existing framework is ill - equipped to handle a Europe-wide banking crisis, because supervision remains in the hands of national regulators. For its part, the ECB may not have enough information in a crisis, and it would find it hard to coordinate the activities of national regulators.

From an economic point of view, it would be best if bank supervision were centralized, either under the ECB or in a new independent European regulator.