V. Answer the following questions:

1. How does the author characterize the political com­ munity?

2. What are the advantages of the gap between Washing­ ton and the rest of the country?

3. But what is so disturbing in this disconnect?

4. What hopes have Americans always placed on the government?

4. Were their hopes realized, at least in any way?

4. How does the author characterize the activities of main American political parties?

4. Do their policies frighten Americans?

5. What is a result of all this political mess?

VI. MAKE UP DISJUNCTIVE QUESTIONS. ASK YOUR FRIEND TO ANSWER THEM.

1. The US political community is a crowd of governing class.

2. The members of this political community subsist on politics, elections, legislation and public policy.

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3. A merica thrives because it is decentralized.

4. Government power remains dispersed among the na­ tional, state and local levels.

5. There is plenty of volunteerism, charity and philan­ thropy.

6. In a representative democracy people should not feel less and less represented.

7. Government must try to solve all social problems.

8. Politicians become more strident in their debates.

9. They consort mostly with their own sympathetic ide­ ologies.

VII. ASK YOUR FRIEND:

—what he understands by political community;

• whether he thinks together with the author that Demo­ crats are reactionaries;

• if he considers Republicans to be radicals;

• why the gap between Washington and the rest of the country is widening;

• what party is more inclined at social reforms;

• what he means by a sympathetic ideology;

• what is his personal opinion of the article «Washing­ ton Disconnected».

VIII. REVIEW THE ARTICLE

TEXT V

I. READ AND TRANSLATE THE ARTICLE: THE GRAND ILLUSION (by Robert J. Samuelson)

Americans are complacent, and their nation's power and reach seem unrivaled. But today's dominance won't last.

It has been the American century in more sense than one. At its start, the United States existed on the fringe of the global order. Americans probably enjoyed the world's highest living standard. But Europe regarded itself as the

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Учебное пособие для философов и политологов

world's commercial centre. However, incomes per person are 45 percent higher in America than in Europe, and 26 percent higher than in Japan.

It is hard to overstate US pre-eminence. Five of the 10 largest multinational corporations are American. Coca-Cola is the world's best-selling soft drink. Hollywood is the world's entertainment capital. The 20^th century has been a contest of ideas. At the outset, there was Empire: the no­tion that some peoples deserve to rule over others. Then there was fascism. Only the American ideal — with it em­phasis on human dignity, freedom and material progress — survived. Triumphant democracy and market economies would slowly erase major geopolitical conflicts.

But even the most powerful nation-state may not be able to tame menaces of the new millennium: nuclear pro­liferation, especially in volatile regions (the Indian subcon­tinent, the Middle East); terrorism, involving — perhaps — weapons of mass destruction; economic instability -wild swings in financial markets or trade flows, and technological breakdowns — whether by accident or sabotage — of vital computer or communication systems. And beyond these threats lie internal challenges to social cohesion and econo­mic well-being.

The most obvious of these is aging. By 2030, the ratio of America's working age population to the older popula­tion is expected to drop from today's 3-1 to 2-1. Govern­ment programs for the retired could raise spending to levels that create oppressive taxes or immense budget deficits.

But let's regard these problems. Let's also discount the possibility that, ambivalent about their nation's role in the world, Americans may tire of being a superpower. Let's focus instead on the narrower promise that the American Century can perpetuate itself through the expansion of de­mocracy and market-based economies. Either this expan­sion will occur or it won't. The trouble is that, whatever happens, American pre-eminence may suffer.

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Suppose that democracy and market economics flourish. America's share of the world economy would decline. It is now about one fifth, but faster economic growth in China, India, Southeast Asia, Africa and South America — where three quarters of the world's 6 billion people live— would shrink that. As other countries grew wealthier and more confident, so would their power to challenge US interests and military technology.

F or years Europe and Japan — with democracies, market economies and strong ties to the United States — have chafed an American leadership. Would Chinese, Indians, Brazilians — with weaker ties — quietly abide US leadership as their strength and status rose? Resentment of America is surely as wide-spread as admiration.

Now consider the alternate possibility: the advance of de­mocracy and markets isn't inevitable. For one reason or an­other, the global economy sputters. Trade protection rises as governments try to preserve jobs. Peoples everywhere empha­size their political, cultural, religious and ethnic differences. Nationalism increases, while popular support for interna­tional policies falls. Governments strain to reconcile economic interdependence and political hostility. In short, the Ameri­can model of economic and political pluralism founders.

As other countries advance, they may resist US views and interests in international organizations. Global compe­tition will intensify. And the overall geopolitical balance may shift. The USA has many problems now, but no obvi­ous crises, but this is half illusion, a deceptive one.

(from «NEWSWEEK» 2000)