4.3 Hedges

The importance of the maximof quality for cooperative interaction in English may be best measured by the number of expressions we use to indicate that what we are saying may not be totally accurate. The initial phrases in (3 a. – c.) and the final phrase in (3d.) are notes to the listener regarding the accuracy of the main statement:

(3) a. As far as I know, they’re married.

b. Imay bemistaken, but I thought I sawawedding ring on her finger.

c. I’m not sure if this is right, but I heard it was a secret ceremony inHawaii.

d. He couldn’t live without her, I guess.

Cautious notes, or hedges, of this type can also be used to show that the speaker is conscious of the quantitymaxim, as in the initial phrases in (4a. – c.) produced in the course of a speaker’s account of her recent vacation:

(4) a.As you probably know, I am terrified of bugs.

b. So, to cut a long story short, we grabbed our stuff and ran.

c. I won’t bore you with all the details, but it was an exciting trip.

Markers tied to the expectation of relevance (from the maxim of relation) can be found in the middle of speakers’ talk when they say things like ‘Oh, by the way’ and go on to mention some potentially unconnected information during a conversation. Speakers also seem to use expressions like ‘anyway’, ‘well, anyway’, to indicate that they may have drifted into a discussion of some possibly non-relevantmaterial and want to stop. Some expressions which may act as hedges on the expectation of relevance are shown as the initial phrases in (5a. – c.) froman office meeting:

(5) a. I don’t know if this is important, but some of the files are missing.

b. This may sound like a dumb question, but whose hand writing is this?

c. Not to change the subject, but is this related to the budget?

The awareness of the expectations ofmannermay also lead speakers to produce hedges of the type shown in the initial phrases in (6a. – c.) heard during an account of a crash:

(6) a. This may be a bit confused, but I remember being in a car. b. I’m not sure if this makes sense, but the car had no lights.

c. I don’t know if this is clear at all, but I think the other car was reversing.

All of these examples of hedges are good indications that the speakers are not only aware of the maxims, but that they want to show that they are trying to observe them. Perhaps such forms also communicate the speakers’ concern that their listeners judge themto be cooperative conversational partners.

There are, however, some circumstances where speakers may not follow the expectations of the cooperative principle. In courtrooms and classrooms, witnesses and students are often called upon to tell people things which are already well-known to those people (thereby violating the quantitymaxim). Such specialized institutional talk is clearly different fromconversation.

4.4 Speech Acts and Events

In attempting to express themselves people do not only produce utterances containing grammatical structures and words, they perform actions via those utterances [2, p. 8]. By producing utterances people not only share certain information, but also perform particular kinds of actions, such as stating, promising, or warning which have to be called speech acts [6, p. 405].

It is, however, important to distinguish between three sorts of thing that one is doing in the course of producing an utterance. These are usually distinguished by the terms locutionary acts, perlocutionary acts, illocutionary acts [1, p. 15].

There is first a locutionary act, which is the basic act of utterance, or producing a meaningful linguistic expression [12, p. 76]. If you have difficulty with actually forming the sounds and words to create a meaningful utterance in a language (for example, because it is foreign or you are tongue-tied), then you might fail to produce a locutionary act.

Producing ‘Ahamokofa’ inEnglishwill not normally count as a locutionary act, whereas (7) will:

(7) I’ve just made some coffee.

purpose. We form an utterance with some kind of function inmind. This is the second dimension, or the illocutionary act [12, p. 77]. The illocutionary act is performed via the communicative force of an utterance [1, p. 16]. We might utter (7) tomake a statement, an offer, an explanation, or for some other communicative purpose. This is also generally known as the illocutionary force of the utterance.

We do not, of course, simply create an utterance with a function without intending it to have an effect. This is the third dimension, the perlocutionary act [12, p. 79]. Depending on the circumstances, you will utter (7) on the assumption that the effect you intended (for example, to account for a wonderful smell, or to get the hearer to drink some coffee). This is also generally known as the perlocutionary effect.

Of these three dimensions, themost discussed is illocutionary force. The illocutionary force of an utterance is what it counts as. The same locutionary act, as shown in (8a.), can count as a prediction (8b.), a promise (8c.), or a warning (8d.). These different analyses (8b. – d.) of the utterance in (8a.) represent different illocutionary forces:

(8) a. I’ll see you later. (= A)

b. [I predict that] A.

c. [I promise you that] A.

d. [I warn you that] A.

These descriptive terms for different kinds of speech acts apply to the speaker’s communicative intention in producing an utterance. The speaker normally expects that his or her communicative intention will be recognized by the hearer. Both speaker and hearer are usually helped in this process by the circumstances surrounding the utterance. These circumstances, including other utterances, are called the speech event [ibid., p. 84; 15, p. 91].

In many ways, it is the nature of the speech event that determines the interpretation of an utterance as performing a particular speech act. On a wintry day the speaker reaches for a cup of tea, believing that it has been freshly made, takes a sip, and produces the utterance in (9). It is likely to be interpreted as a complaint:

(9) This tea is really cold!

Changing the circumstances to a really hot summer day with the speaker being given a glass of iced tea by the hearer, taking a sip and producing the utterance in (9), it is likely to be interpreted as praise. If the same utterance can be interpreted as two different kinds of speech act, then obviously no simple one utterance to one action correspondence will he possible.