Brazilian foreign policy to Africa under Lula

In 2002, for the first time since the country’s independence in 1822, Brazilians elected a left-wing politician to become their president. Lula da Silva, a former trade-unionist and leader of the Worker’s Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT) was elected with 53 million votes or 62% of the valid votes after trying in three other occasions to become president.

In his inauguration speech in January 2003, Lula mentioned his interest in strengthening the deep bonds between Brazil and the African continent, in order to help Africa reach its full potential ( IPEA, World Bank, 2011, p.43). In fact, even before the inauguration, Marco Aurelio Garcia, a long-time foreign policy advisor to the Worker’s Party, and who was to become the presidential special advisor on international relations, had acknowledged that Brazil was in need of an African policy¹⁰⁹.

Brazil’s strategy in Africa under the Lula government can be defined as being is based on two main fronts: first, cooperation with South Africa, due to the country’s economic potential and influence in Southern Africa and second, cooperation with the Portuguese speaking African countries, that received support from the Brazilian government to become independent from Portugal in the mid-1970s and currently receive around 70% of all Brazilian technical cooperation to Africa (IPEA, 2010).

During the Lula government, the African continent became Brazil’s fourth largest commercial partner. Trade between Brazil and Africa increased from 4 billion in 2000 to 20 billion in 2010 ( IPEA, World Bank, 2011, p.83).Between 2003 and 2010, 48 African heads of state visited Brazil and 67 African foreign ministers visited the country in the same period ( IPEA, World Bank, 2011,p.123). In 2009, the Brazilian National Bank for Social and Economic Development (BNDES) started a line of credit worth 265 million dollars and another one worth 360 million in 2010 for companies that were willing to conduct business in Africa ( IPEA, World Bank, 2011, p.7).

Lula also pursued some important initiatives in the social aspect. During his first year as president, Lula sanctioned a law making it mandatory for elementary and high schools in Brazil, both private and public, to offer classes on African and Afro-Brazilian history¹¹⁰. Another important social initiative was the creation of the Secretary for the Promotion of Racial Equality Policies in 2006, in order to promote the improvement in living conditions of the Afro-Brazilian population and other groups that have been historically marginalized in Brazilian history, such as the indigenous peoples.

Regarding diplomacy, Lula continued with a scholarship program, created in 2002 by President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, for Afro-Brazilians to receive financial assistant to pay for their preparatory studies for admission into the national diplomatic training institute. The diplomatic profession in Brazil is a historically elite career in Brazil and the exam is one of the most competitive exams within Brazilian civil service. The initiative had the intension of making Brazil’s diplomatic body more representative of the country’s racial diversity.

In addition, it is equally important to note that the effort of increasing the diplomatic presence in the African continent has not been met with the same enthusiasm on the part of Brazilian diplomats. The Brazilian Foreign Minister faces a shortage of diplomats willing to serve in the newly established diplomatic missions in African and Asian nations classified as “C and D” postings (an “A” post would be London, Paris or New York) and the staff in some of the missions includes only one diplomat, normally the designated ambassador. New diplomats resist serving in these posts because they believe that it will limit their opportunities for further promotion within the career¹¹¹.

In addition, Brazil’s intention of increasing relations within the Global South was faced with internal criticism on the part of businessmen, analysts and especially former diplomats associated with the Cardoso administration. Brazil’s approach to Africa was also part of this domestic controversy, especially when Lula visited leaders that were questioned by the Western international community as having low or inexistent democratic credentials. President Lula was heavily criticized for visiting Equatorial Guinea’s President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo in July 2010, President Paul Biya of Cameroon in April 2005, President Denis Sassou-Nguesso of Congo on October 2007, President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso also in October 2007 and the former Libyan head of state, Muammar Gaddafi, on two occasions, the latest in July 2009.

Nonetheless, even the controversy generated by episodes such as the visits to Libya and the issue with Equatorial Guinea was not enough to reduce the heavy symbolism of Brazil’s relations with Africa under Lula. In April 2005, during a visit to the continent, President Lula went to the island of Gorée in Senegal, the location of a former fortress from which Africans were sent to work as slaves in American countries, including Brazil. Echoing a similar visit by Pope John Paul II in 1992, Lula apologized for the use of African slaves in Brazil and recognized that Brazil had a historic debt towards Africa. At the ceremony, Lula was greeted by Senegal’s president Abdoulaye Wade as being Brazil’s first African president¹¹².

Although the symbolic dimension played an important part in the Brazilian government’s relations with Africa, Brazil’s approach towards the continent also involves pragmatic and strategic considerations. During a July 2004 visit to Africa, Lula forgave Gabon’s 35 million dollars debt with Brazil with the intention that this amount would be converted in credit from the Gabonese government to Brazilian companies that wish to invest in the country¹¹³. Concerning multilateral affairs, the issue of Security Council reform and a future permanent seat for Brazil was discussed for example in former President Lula’s visit to Cameroon, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria, Ghana and Senegal on April 2005. The fact that African nations could not reach a consensus regarding which states could occupy permanent seats separated for the African continent was a frustrating outcome for Brazilian diplomacy.

One element that has also strengthened Brazil’s recent engagement with the African continent under Lula, is the creation of two multilateral initiatives that include African nations. The first initiative refers to the South America-Arab States Summit¹¹⁴ created in 2005, and which includes 12 South American states and 22 Arab nations, 10 of which located in the African continent. The second initiative refers to the Africa-South America Summit¹¹⁵ initiated in 2006, with 49 African members, and that led to the creation of an Africa-South America Cooperation Forum (ASACOF). Both initiatives reflect Brazil’s historical emphasis on South-South rhetoric and have contributed to the country’s regional leadership role within South America. In addition, Brazil has also sought to establish relations with the African Union (a resident embassy in Addis Ababa was inaugurated in 2005 and the ambassador was also accredited to the AU). A cooperation agreement between Brazil and the AU was signed in 2007 and former President Lula was a guest at the AU’s Summit in Sirte ( Libya) in 2009¹¹⁶. President Rousseff has capitalized on former President Lula’s popularity within the African continent¹¹⁷ and designated him as the head of the Brazilian delegation to the AU Summit held in Malabo in 2011¹¹⁸.

Furthermore, Brazil promotes relations with some African nations through the ZOPACAS (The South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone). Initially established and promoted by Brazil in 1985 (with strong support from Nigeria), as part of an effort to reduce the threaten of militarization of the South Atlantic during the Cold War and to limit apartheid South-Africa’s influence in the region, the ZOPACAS has gained new importance with Brazil’s recent discovery¹¹⁹ of its pre-salt oil reserves located in the continental shelves, within the country’s Exclusive Economic Zone. The protection of these reserves has become a national security priority for the Brazilian Navy (which refers to Brazil’s South Atlantic territory as the “Blue Amazon”) and is included in the country’s new defense strategy launched in December 2008¹²⁰.