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Evaluation

This two-dimensional taxonomy is limited to the cognitive domain, despite the fact that one of its authors, David Krathwohl, played a part in extending the original work of Bloom and his team into the affective domain (Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964). While acknowledging that almost every cognitive objective involves an affective component, the present authors judged that inclusion of the affective domain would create an overly complex taxonomy, which would not, for that reason, become widely adopted. However, they consider that their revised cognitive domain taxonomy ‘does contain some seeds for future affective development’ in that metacognitive knowledge goes some way to bridging the cognitive and affective domains (Anderson and Krathwohl, 2001, p. 301). Mayer (2002) argues that in addition to the new category of metacognition, the revised taxonomy recognises the role of metacognitive and motivational processes, in that it clarifies their role within the cognitive process dimension, and in particular within the categories of create and evaluate.

The shortcomings of this taxonomy still lie in its over-emphasis of the cognitive domain to the neglect of the others and its absence of a convincing explanation of how all three domains might interact in the human experience of thinking, feeling and learning.

The widely used terms ‘critical thinking’ and ‘problem-solving’ have not been included as major categories within the taxonomy, since the authors view these terms as having similar characteristics to their category understand. However, they maintain that, unlike understand, critical thinking and problem-solving tend to involve cognitive processes in several categories across their cognitive process dimension.

The creation of a matrix whereby cognitive processes operate with different types of subject matter content (i.e. knowledge) provides teachers with a useful tool to help analyse their teaching objectives, activities and assessment. Classifying learning objectives within the framework is likely to increase a teacher’s understanding of each objective and help them plan ways to ensure that pupils succeed. Classifying longer units of work allows teachers to make choices relating to coverage across both dimensions. We note, also, that this

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approach has been taken by several other theorists: Romiszowski, Jonassen and Tessmer, for example.

There is little to choose between Bloom and Anderson and Krathwohl in their treatment of types of knowledge. The revised term for Bloom’s ‘knowledge of specifics’ is ‘factual knowledge’. What Bloom calls ‘knowledge of ways and means’ is now called ‘procedural knowledge’, and Bloom’s ‘knowledge of the universals and abstractions in a field’ is now labelled as ‘conceptual knowledge’. However, while Bloom made implicit references to what we now call metacognition, Anderson and Krathwohl explicitly list ‘metacognition’ as a type of knowledge. But it is open to question whether the term ‘metacognition’ refers to knowledge of a different type. It is not uniquely distinguished by the processes involved (knowing that, knowing how and understanding ideas), rather by its content.

While Anderson and Krathwohl give weight to the separate classification of metacognitive knowledge, they do not explicitly address the monitoring, control and regulation of students’ cognition, arguing that this involves ‘different types of cognitive processes and therefore fits into the cognitive process dimension’ (Anderson and Krathwohl, 2001, p. 43). When addressing metacognition within the knowledge dimension the authors provide a rationale for the inclusion of metacognitive knowledge, a comprehensive overview of each of the three types of metacognitive knowledge along with illustrative examples. Their treatment of metacognition within the cognitive process dimension attracts little attention and provides the reader with only two examples. This decision results in an inconsistent treatment of the two aspects of metacognition (knowledge and self-regulation).

Theoretical advances in educational psychology, and to a lesser extent in cognitive psychology, have contributed to this revision of Bloom’s framework. The focus on knowledge types, and the delineation of process categories into specific cognitive processes, is based largely on ‘an examination of other classification systems’ (Anderson and Krathwohl, 2001, p. 66), dating from 1969 to 1998, and including Sternberg’s model of ‘successful intelligence’ (Sternberg, 1998). While acknowledging that the framework should ideally be based on a single, widely accepted, and functional theory of learning, the authors note

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that, despite recent advances, we are still without a single psychological theory that adequately provides a basis for all learning. The framework reflects the authors’ beliefs that knowledge is structured by the learner in line with a rationalist–constructivist tradition. They do not adhere to the idea that knowledge is organised in stages or in system-wide logical structures, as in traditional developmental stage models of thinking.

Anderson and Krathwohl claim their taxonomy is ‘value neutral and therefore can be used by those operating from a variety of philosophical positions’ (2001, p. 296). This is broadly true, despite the implication (equally present in Bloom’s taxonomy) that more complex thinking is usually more highly valued.

The taxonomy was designed to help teachers understand and implement a standards-based curriculum. The authors expect the framework to be used mainly by teachers who are given a set of objectives, and are expected to deliver instruction that enables a large proportion of pupils to achieve the expected standard. However, Noble (2004) describes how, with support, 16 teachers successfully used a matrix which combined the revised Bloom taxonomy with Gardner’s multiple intelligences in order to formulate their own differentiated curriculum objectives.

The dominant theme running throughout the Anderson and Krathwohl text is the alignment of learning objectives, instruction and assessment. The taxonomy encourages teachers to focus on coverage, thereby allowing students to experience learning opportunities across the cognitive domain. The purpose of the framework is to help teachers clarify and communicate what they intend their students to learn. The authors are less concerned with how teachers teach, since it is their view that most instructional decisions depend on the teacher’s creativity, ingenuity and wisdom.

There are several reasons why the taxonomy may prove attractive to practitioners. It does not seek to radically change how they teach or challenge their beliefs about teaching and learning. The authors use language that teachers are familiar with, and exemplify use of the taxonomy with detailed case studies that reflect current classroom practice.